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Revolution. New York: Penguin Books, 2015, 443 p.
Reviewed by Konstantin Dragaš*
The foreign policy of Tsarist Russia, its 
goals, scope, contradictions as well as its 
prominent protagonists – diplomats, min-
isters, advisors – and their diverse views 
on international relations in the decade 
preceding the outbreak of the First World 
War constitute the core of Dominic Lieven’s 
interesting monograph on Russian history 
based on documentary sources – The End 
of Tsarist Russia. It is a book which seeks 
to answer the question of what challenges, 
problems and confusions the Russian Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs and, above all, Em-
peror Nicholas II, and many figures in his 
entourage, faced in 1900–14 in the light of 
Russia’s defeat in the war against Japan of 
1905, the creation of an alliance with France 
and Britain, growing Austro-Hungarian 
and German expansionism and the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire. In other words: to 
what extent did personal views, inclinations 
and political comments of the diplomats 
influence the shaping of Russian foreign 
policy? 
What makes this study original is above 
all the author’s interesting understanding of 
the causes of the First World War, which 
include civilian society, nationalism, grow-
ing literacy (for example, among the popula-
tion of eastern Europe) but also the inabil-
ity of the executive branch of the autocratic 
regimes to control public opinion, whose 
influence on the shaping of political devel-
opments was not at all negligible. Another 
feature is reflected in the view that the Rus-
sians lost the war of 1914–17 because of the 
failure of Russian government (the execu-
tive and, later, the legislature – the Duma) 
to get the peasantry and most of the con-
scripted army to believe in what Lieven calls 
“abstract” war aims, such as the conquest 
of Constantinople or “European balance of 
power”. The inabilty to overcome the dis-
crepancy between the plans of the elites and 
the people’s lack of motivation for war, i.e. 
the failure to achieve unity in terms of com-
mand, level of modernization and homog-
enization of the nation around clear goals, 
was one of the factors that led to the collapse 
of the Russian monarchy; by contrast, the 
wars with Napoleon or Hitler were fought 
with a clear internal cohesion of ideas, aims, 
plans and economic strength. Moreover, the 
author introduces the concept of the Second 
World for certain states that were insuf-
ficiently industrialized and economically 
competitive before 1914, among which he 
includes Russia, Spain, Italy.   
The focus of attention, however, is on 
the protagonists and priorities of Russian 
foreign policy from the end of the nine-
teenth century to 1914. Russian foreign 
policy had to balance between two oppos-
ing parties – one inspired by the principle 
of loyalty to the dynastic ties between the 
monarchies in Europe, the other, by strong 
Slavophilism. Emperor Nicholas II contin-
ued his father Alexander III’s Slavophile 
policy towards the Balkan Slavs, but paid 
much more attention to the Far East, Japan, 
expansion into Asia and the maintenance of 
stable relations with Germany. The primary 
goal of Russian diplomacy was the conquest 
of Constantinople, the achievemnt of eco-
nomic and military dominance in the Black 
Sea and the strengthening of Russian pres-
ence in the broader area of Euroasia – the 
idea on which the Russian diplomats agreed 
in principle.   
An important question raised by 
Lieven’s book is whether Russian foreign 
policy in the period of 1900–14 was based 
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on Slavophile traditions. Influential advo-
cates of collaboration with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, realistic “pragmatists” and 
critics of Slavophile policy were, for exam-
ple, Nikolai Girs (foreign minister 1882–
95), Vladimir Meshcherskii (editor of the 
Grazhdanin/Citizen), Roman Rozen (Rus-
sian ambassador to Japan 1903–1905), Al-
exander Girs. On the other hand, Sergei Sa-
zonov (foreign minister 1910–1916), Alex-
ander Nelidov or the Grand Duke Nikolai 
Nikolaievich Romanov were Slavophiles 
and advocated Russia’s strong support to the 
Balkan Slavs. Both parties had an equal fol-
lowing among the ruling aristocracy; Lieven 
claims in his conclusion that the predic-
tions of the “realistic” party would prove to 
be correct in many aspects. Many Russian 
diplomats, such as Alexander von Benck-
endorff in London or Count Nicholas von 
Osten-Sacken in Berlin, had sympathies for 
the politics of the country they served in and 
sought to synchronize the goals of the coun-
try they represented with it. A special place 
in this study is held by the politician Grigo-
rii Trubetskoi, who believed that the Straits 
and Constantinople could not be taken or 
naval dominance in the Black Sea achieved 
without Russia’s strong and unquestionable 
support to the Balkan Slavs.1 
After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia, 
militarily weakened and hit by a revolution 
and strikes, sought to renew its armies. The 
poor armament, the plan for an alliance of 
Balkan Slav states, the insecure western 
border (especially with Austria-Hungary 
and the Ukranian population which inhab-
ited a large part of it) and the system of bi-
lateral agreements (with Italy, for example) 
made Russia back down in the Annexa-
tion crisis (1908–9) and the Balkan Wars 
(1912–13). As a result, the Russian govern-
ment was frequently crticized by the cadet, 
liberal, “nationalist” and Slavophile press. 
1  D. Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The 
March to World War I and Revolution (New 
York 2015), 130–131. 
Nevertheless, although stressesing the “guilt” 
of the Austro-Hungarian “war” party for the 
outbreak of the war, the author does not pay 
due attention to the factor of German diplo-
macy’s long-term goals regarding the poten-
tial colonization of Russian territory.
In the period of 1900–14, and espe-
cially after 1904, Russian diplomacy was 
compelled to adjust to Germany’s constant 
fear of the potential policy of encirclement. 
Many diplomats warned that good rela-
tions with Germany would be sacrificed in 
favour of a loose Anglo-Russian agreement 
the Germans sought to thwart. This adjust-
ment was not an easy matter both because 
the Russian diplomats did not understand 
fully the German foreign policy plans and 
because they wanted to maintain good rela-
tions with both. This did not go easily be-
cause of diverging interests as regards the 
Ottoman Empire, Persia and Afghanistan, 
but also because of a good trade exchange 
(especially with Germany). As a result of 
Russian diplomacy’s being anxious not to 
make rash moves as regards the status quo 
in the Balkans, it frequently yielded to Ger-
man and Austro-Hungarian influence. The 
complaisant policy towards Germany and 
Austria-Hungary may also be explained by 
the nationalist factor in eastern Europe, no-
tably the issue of the Ukranian population 
in Austrian and Russian Galicia: the nations 
whose fate was tied to the westernmost bor-
der of the Russian Empire were strongly 
disliked by the Russian autocracy and their 
separatism was not easy to control.
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